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1.Introduction
Inspired by the international financial and euro zone crises, and by the influx of refugees into 
Europe, the populist political parties have raised the public agenda the claim that there is a 
widening gap between the elite and the people. This claim, however, is not new in the field of 
energy policy, which has been characterized as a policy sector where citizens’ involvement is 
more limited than in most other policy sectors. An American study showed that organizational 
barriers to more extensive interest representation were higher in the energy sector than in other 
policy domains [1]. Some firms, especially state-owned and, more generally, those operating in 
the energy supply, have had privileged access to decision-making arenas, which have remained 
mostly closed off to average citizens [2]. 
Similar findings have also been reported in Finland. Despite the new rules of the game – from 
monopolies and extensive regulation via competition and deregulation to re-regulation – and 
the Europeanization of the Finnish energy sector, the composition of the energy elite has been 
fairly stable from the end of 1980s until the end of the first decade of the 2000s. The energy 
elite has been dominated by energy producers. Civic associations and consumer-citizens have 
had difficulties in gaining access to the energy policy decision-making arenas [3]. 
The purpose of the present study is to address whether the attitudinal distance between the 
Finnish energy elite (decision-makers and experts) and the citizenry has changed regarding the 
energy policy between 2007 and 2016, and whether their attitudinal differences were more 
concerned with the substance of energy policy than with the process of policy-making. The 
rationale for studying the views of the elites and the citizenry stems from the normative ideals 
of classical democracy; citizens must be able to influence political decision-making and they 
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also actively use this right. This requires responsiveness of the elites towards citizens; the gap 
between them cannot be wide and above all, it should not grow. The starting point of our study, 
the year 2007, represents a period of rapid and stable economic growth, while the year 2016 
represents the immediate time after a prolonged recession that resulted from both international 
economic crises and domestic political decisions. A major political scandal also became public 
in 2008. Thus, the legitimacy of the political rule was called into question.  
According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, pp. 25, 36, 40), there has been little research 
on how the citizenry want their democratic process to work. Since the birth of democracy in 
Athens 2,500 years ago, philosophers have been voicing their opinions on the proper working 
of government. Since then this has been a major research topic in political philosophy (e.g. 
Swift 2014) [4] and moral philosophy (e.g. Rachels 2007) [5]. Political scientists have studied 
citizens’ support for specific policies, political parties, governmental institutions, and for 
democracy in general, but citizens have not often been asked in detail about their attitudes on 
how they want their government to work [6]. However, in Finland some political scientists have 
analyzed empirically citizens’ attitudes on the working of democratic processes [7,8]. 
Americans, for example, were found to be attuned to the way government works more than to 
what it produces (i.e., they pay attention to the processes more than the policies). This finding 
was interpreted to support “stealth democracy”, a form of democracy in which people do not 
want to make political decisions themselves but leave the decision-making in the hands of 
selfless politicians and various experts [6].  
The topic of our study, energy policy, will be defined in this study as the political steering 
conducted by political decision-makers and public authorities focusing on energy management. 
Energy policy covers research, planning, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation 
pertaining to the goals and measures of political decision-makers and public authorities, which 
focuses on the production, purchase, storage, transfer and delivery of energy, and on energy 
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consumption. However, energy policy is not determined exclusively by decisions and measures 
made by politicians and civil servants, and implementation of energy policy depends heavily 
on the business sector. Firms and interest groups seek to influence energy policy to promote 
their own interests and shape its content de facto [9].  
Finnish policy-making has special characteristics by international standards. According to Rask 
(2008, p. 199) and Rucht (1997, p. 283), the Finnish governmental policies for science, 
technology, and energy (e.g. nuclear power, information technology, and biotechnology) have 
rested on exceptionally high trust in technology and technological development among the 
citizenry [10,11]. Moreover, with respect to citizens’ trust in various societal institutions, the 
universities, science and research in general were outweighed only by the police and the 
judiciary [12]. This attitudinal climate has been reflected in decision-making. While 
construction of new nuclear power plants has been prohibited in many countries, the Finnish 
Parliament licensed the construction of two nuclear power plants in 2010. Moreover, Finland 
is among the first countries in which the process for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 
the bedrock has been authorized both at the national (Parliament in 2001) and local (municipal 
council in 2000) levels [13]. Permission for construction of the facility was granted in 2015. 
This study proceeds as follows. First, social changes, mainly deep economic fluctuations and a 
political scandal, which likely affected the citizens’ attitudes from 2007 to 2016, are outlined. 
Second, the theoretical starting points concerning stealth democracy and the politics of 
expertise are defined based on previous studies. Third, a model of elite structures for evaluating 
empirical findings is outlined, and the research methods, datasets, and hypotheses are imposed. 
Fourth, the analysis is composed of four sections; the two first sections focus on the substance 
of energy policy, and the attitudes of the energy elite and the citizenry are addressed with respect 
to their normative views on the Finnish energy policy and the utilization of various energy 
sources in energy production; the third section focuses on the views of the energy elite and the 
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general population on the process of energy policy-making; and the fourth section outlines the 
support for stealth democracy among the citizenry with different socio-economic backgrounds. 
Finally, the research questions are answered, and the findings discussed in light of the 
theoretical starting points. 
 
2. Changing political involvement in Finland from 2007 to 2016 
After the early 1990s, the societal operating environment of the Finnish elites and the general 
population was dominated by deep economic fluctuations. The Finnish economy collapsed 
more drastically in the early 1990s than any other developed market economy after the Second 
World War [14] and the country plunged into the deepest recession in its history. Social services 
were cut, and the welfare state began to disintegrate as a result of the cuts in government 
expenditures. This “great recession” in 1991-1993 was followed by rapid economic growth 
based mainly on governmental investments in research and development and the expansion of 
the electronics industry, especially Nokia Ltd. However, Finland’s economic boom was halted 
in 2008 by the international financial crisis and the euro zone crisis. Due to that the Finnish 
economy is heavily dependent on exports, the GNP decreased by 8% in 2009 compared with 
2008. Although this recession was only about half as severe as the recession of the 1990s, the 
GNP still decreased in Finland more than in other euro area countries and in those EU member 
states that had joined the Union before 2004 [15]. The recession originating from 2008 lasted 
longer than the recession of the early 1990s; the GNP is still approximately 5% lower than 
before the crises, and a slight economic growth (0.5%) started as late as 2015.  
In addition to the decreased governmental output as a result of the recession, the elites’ 
legitimacy was challenged by political scandals. In particular, the political elite was disturbed 
by the election campaign funding scandal of 2008, which was the most serious political scandal 
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in Finland to date as measured by the publicity surrounding the events [16]. This scandal 
together with the international financial crisis, the euro zone crisis, and the Greek and 
Portuguese bail-outs, which dominated the public debate from 2008 to 2011, undermined the 
legitimacy of the major political parties and affected the results of the 2011 general election; 
electoral support of the populist Finns Party increased from 4.1% in 2007 to 19.1% in 2011. In 
the next general election in 2015, the support for the Finns party decreased somewhat (17.7%) 
but the party rose to the inner core of power, i.e., the government. The new government that 
was formed after the general election of 2015 started to increase employers’ benefits and to cut 
citizens’ welfare services to boost economic growth. 
A substantial body of scholarly literature indicates that many post-industrial societies have 
experienced a withdrawal from conventional political activism. This transformation also applies 
to Finland, with some important exceptions. The voter turnout in Finland (67.9% in general the 
election of 2007; 70.5% in 2011; and 70.1% in 2015) was within the lowest third of all Western 
democracies and has decreased more sharply than in many other countries, especially within 
Scandinavia [17]. However, Finns’ trust in the political and legal systems and in other people 
was the highest among the 28 EU member states in 2013. [18]. According to the 2008 European 
Social Survey, Finns participated in civic associations more than people in any of the other 24 
countries in the study. However, Finnish people’s subjective civil efficacy (the sense that one 
can understand political processes and participate in them meaningfully) has been much lower, 
on average, than in Europe. In 2008, it was the third-lowest among 23 European countries [19]. 
Similarly, Rapeli [20] showed that Finns’ knowledge base is not at such a level, which would 
enable well-argued and thorough discussion on political issues. 
Finns also have low civic efficacy concerning energy policy-making. Clearly more than half of 
the citizens were dissatisfied with their potential to influence energy policy; the proportion of 
the citizenry who agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have 
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not been heard sufficiently enough in energy policy decisions” was 71% (mean) in 1983-1993, 
67% in 1994-2000, and 64 % in 2001-2007 [21]. 
Stolle and Micheletti (2006, pp. 266, 39) have argued that political consumerism may substitute 
for conventional forms of participation that are increasingly perceived as less efficient and less 
suitable for the global nature of political problems. Political consumerism can be defined as 
“actions taken by those who make choices among producers, products and services with the 
aim of changing objectionable institutional or market practices.” [22]. In Finland, as in the 
Nordic countries in general, the endorsement of political consumerism has been relatively high 
since 2007. With respect to influencing the energy policy-making Finns’ have more trust in 
their consumption choices than voting in general elections [23]. 
All in all, since 2007 the Finnish citizenry has been characterized, in international comparison, 
by low levels of voter turnout, civic efficacy, and political knowledge but high support for 
political consumerism. All of these factors reflect citizens’ low trust in their possibilities to 
influence policy-making trough representative democracy. Moreover, the economic downturn, 
a major political scandal, and the influx of refugees have undermined governments’ output in 
the face of the citizenry. However, simultaneously the citizenry has been profiled by high trust 
in the regime and technology. Because of this special attitudinal combination we may anticipate 
that citizens are increasingly willing to give political decision-making in the hands of experts 
rather than elected officials, as the theory of stealth democracy suggests. However, it is 
unnecessary and even impossible on the basis of available data to specify the effect of these 
individual factors on the endorsement of stealth democracy. This ambivalent attitudinal climate 
together with the tradition of energy policy as a relatively closed policy sector for citizen 
involvement make Finland a particularly fruitful object for studying the relationship between 
the energy elite and the citizenry and for testing the theory of stealth democracy.  
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3. Approach of stealth democracy to political involvement 
A common notion among social scientists concerning citizens’ strong, even increasing interest 
in political involvement has been challenged. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, 
1-2, 143, 127), rather than wanting a more active, participatory democracy, a large number of 
people want what they call “stealth democracy”. Their claim is that the people do not routinely 
play an active role in decision-making, or in providing input for or monitoring decision-makers. 
The goal in stealth democracy is for decisions to be made efficiently, objectively, and without 
commotion and disagreement. Stealth aircraft such as B-2 bombers are difficult to see with 
standard radar techniques, but everyone knows they exist. Similarly, the citizens want 
democratic procedures to exist but not to be visible on a routine basis. They want to be able to 
make democracy visible and accountable on those rare occasions that they are motivated to be 
involved. Just like stealth bombers can be made to show up on radar when desired, the citizenry 
want to know that their government will become visible, accountable, and representative should 
they decide such traits are warranted. However, until that time, most people prefer not to be 
involved and therefore desire unobtrusive accountability. Thanks to representatives, people do 
not need to constantly pay attention to many issues about which they do not care. Because 
individuals are often too uninformed, unmotivated, or narrow to exert appropriate political 
influence, politicians should make the decisions for them [6]. 
We cannot fully understand citizens’ attitudes toward government without taking into account 
how they think government ought to work and how they think government works in practice. 
As far as the citizens’ attitudes toward government are concerned, they are more affected by 
the process of government than by the policies government enacts. Dissatisfaction usually stems 
from perceptions of how government does its business, not what the government does. In fact, 
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the policy matters, but process, rather than policy, is often a better predictor of citizens’ attitudes 
and behaviors with respect to government [6]. 
The fact that citizens have preferences for policy and process has also been shown in European 
studies. In the absence of clearly formulated interests and related identities that representatives 
could work to promote, elected officials have become more and more detached from their 
constituency. Voting has come to resemble a Schumpeterian [24] picture of democratic elitism 
where the main concern is to elect people into positions of power, leaving actual issues of 
substance and policy directions largely indeterminable. This is a particular concern in the 
Finnish proportional electoral system where citizens can never know at the ballot box exactly 
how their votes will be used; which political parties will form the government coalition, and 
what objectives they will adopt in the government program [25].  
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2005, pp. 7, 122, 85-6, 139-143) argue that people want to distance 
themselves from government not because of a system defect but because many people are 
simply averse to political conflict and many others believe political conflict is unnecessary and 
an indication that something is wrong with governmental procedures. Elites are not what the 
citizens fear; rather, it is self-serving elites who are feared. The citizenry is surprisingly smitten 
with the notion of elite experts making choices - provided that those experts have nothing to 
gain from selecting one option over another. Because the citizenry agrees on societal goals, no 
conflict need exist, and governing is reduced to the mechanical process of implementing a good 
plan for attaining these goals. Determining appropriate policy action thus requires no elaborate 
institutions and powerful elected officials. In short, contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
citizenry like the concept of objective bureaucrats making their technical decisions. “People 
want to avoid government by people who act selfishly, not government by experts and elites” 
[6]. Thus, stealth democracy represents elitist conception of democracy.  
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However, the stealth democracy claim that the experts representing, for example, business and 
public administration are legitimate policy-makers equal to the elected officials, has long been 
challenged for by several scholars. According to Frank Fischer (1990, pp. 14-21, 40, 148), 
fundamental to the critique of technocratic expertise is the argument that experts have 
overrelied on and misused scientific and technical knowledge. Thus, technocracy is a deep-
seated challenge to democracy and its political form of decision-making [26]. 
Western science and technology policy has generally been seen as a policy sector that is 
dominated by experts and public administration, where political decision-makers have neither 
played, nor had an aspiration to play a role [27, 28]. This is also the case in Finland; 
governmental policy-making in the field of science and technology has been dominated by 
experts, perhaps more so than any other policy sector. Despite its vital position in societal 
development, however, this has played only a marginal role in the agenda of political parties 
and Parliament. Although most political parties had comprehensive party programs dealing 
with science policy as early as the 1960s and 1970s, these programs have since been absent. In 
fact, the link between science and technology policy and civil society has remained more fragile 
than the link with political decision-makers [29]. However, Finns have trusted most in the 
technology among various actors or devices in solving the environmental problems caused by 
energy production and consumption [9]. 
 
4. Model of elite structures, research questions and hypotheses 
The existence of elites is an unavoidable fact in all past and current societies, both in democratic 
and un-democratic ones [30]. Elites and democracy are not necessarily mutually exclusive but 
the compatibility of elites with democratic principles depends on elites’ characteristics or types. 
A typology of elite structures can be outlined based on two variables; degree of the elites’ 
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openness and degree of their coherence. The elite structure can be described as coherent (or 
exclusive) when the elites come from a more privileged socio-economic background than the 
citizenry; they are recruited from society’s highest strata; they have very close mutual contacts, 
and they share similar attitudes. There is a wide gulf between the attitudes of elites and the 
citizenry. At the other end of the typology, a fragmented elite structure is characterized by a 
broad socio-economic recruitment base, limited interplay between elites, and a wide gulf 
between various elites in terms of attitudes. Elites might share certain societal rules of the game 
in common, for instance a consensus about the democratic process, but they differ in their views 
about many societal objectives. On the other hand, there are close links between the citizenry 
and elites, and they share similar attitudes. In a coherent elite structure consensus among the 
various elite groups is so strong that we can talk about the existence of a single power elite [31]. 
In a fragmented elite structure, by contrast, the consensus among elites is so weak that it is not 
justified to talk about a single power elite. As regards the functioning of democracy, a coherent 
elite structure is inadequate, whereas a fragmented elite structure best meets the criteria for 
classical democracy [32]. This theoretical model will be applied in this study to analyze the 
attitudinal differences between the energy elite and the citizenry as well as in interpreting the 
empirical findings.  
The research question in the present study was to address whether the attitudinal distance 
between the Finnish energy elite (decision-makers and experts) and the citizenry has changed 
with respect to the energy policy between 2007 and 2016, and also whether their attitudinal 
difference have been more concerned with the substance of energy policy than the process of 
policy-making. Based on the theory of stealth democracy, we empirically tested four hypotheses 
concerning the elite’s and citizens’ views on the substance and process of energy policy; we 
focussed on the normative views dealing with the statements concerning energy policy, the use 
of various energy sources, and the principles dealing with the process of energy policy-making.  
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We hypothesized, first, that the citizenry endorses stealth democracy more than the energy 
elite. Because citizens’ civic efficacy was rather low, they felt that their opinions were not 
sufficiently heard in energy policy-making and their trust in elected officials was relatively low 
as a result of decreased governmental output caused by the international financial crisis (2008), 
the euro zone crisis (2009), the election funding scandal (2008), and the refugees influx into 
Finland (32,000 in 2015). For example, Finns’ trust in the government decreased in 2007-2012, 
on average, more than in other OECD countries [33]. Citizens likely trusted more in experts 
representing business and public administration, who they saw as more objective and 
independent than the elected officials. However, the elite, that is decision-makers and experts, 
were more knowledgeable, owing to their high levels of education and occupation, than the 
general population with respect to who should have the final say in the democratic decision-
making process, according to the Constitution. Moreover, the elite members were themselves 
decision-makers, or at least influential experts in the field of energy policy. It is evident that the 
effects of above-mentioned societal changes on the elite were lesser than on the general 
population. Thus, we hypothesized, second, that the support for stealth democracy increased 
among the citizenry but remained unchangeable within the energy elite from 2007 to 2016. 
Our third hypothesis was that the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry 
is lesser related to policy than to process. In other words, the elite’s and the citizenry’s 
perceptions of the substance of energy policy were closer to each other than to the ways and by 
whom the decisions are made. The theory of stealth democracy suggests that people are affected 
more by the process of government than by the policies government enacts, and their 
dissatisfaction usually stems from perceptions of how government operates, not what the 
government does [6]. 
We hypothesized, fourth, that socio-economically underprivileged people endorse stealth 
democracy more than the privileged. This hypothesis was based on the findings of the Finnish 
12 
 
electoral study that the privileged citizens vote more actively in general elections and have a 
higher civic efficacy than the less privileged. The variables under study were sex, age, 
education, field of education, occupational position, political party identification, and the type 
of home ownership all of which have explained citizens’ electoral behaviour [34].  
 
5. Datasets of the study 
Methodologically, this study was based on postal surveys (and an Internet survey in 2016) 
conducted among a random sample representing Finns aged 18-75 years. The field work, 
including one reminder round, was carried out from May to October, 2007 and August to 
October, 2016. The rate of response was rather low (30.0% in 2007 and 33.6% in 2016), but 
the large sample size (N=4000) ensured that the data sufficiently represented the general 
Finnish population.  
However, the data deviates in minor respects from the whole population. People living in small 
municipalities (4,000-8,000 inhabitants) were somewhat overrepresented, while those living in 
large municipalities (more than 80,000 inhabitants) were underrepresented. However, the 
respondents represented the various regions of the country with an even distribution. 
Individuals living in detached houses were clearly overrepresented but those living in apartment 
houses or terraced houses were underrepresented. Similarly, people living in their own flats 
were overrepresented, while those living in rented flats are underrepresented. Compared to the 
population at large, the highly educated (individuals with at least a Master’s degree or 
equivalent) were overrepresented. For education fields, people educated in the engineering and 
service branch were somewhat underrepresented. With regard to occupational groups, lower 
functionaries were underrepresented, while blue-collar workers and pensioners were somewhat 
overrepresented [35, 36]. It is possible that the respondents were somewhat more interested in 
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energy issues than the general population. In 2007, 26% had changed their electricity supplier, 
while in 2016, this number was as high as 52%.  
The third elite dataset was collected between December 2008 and March 2009, and the number 
of respondents in the structured elite interview was 25 (seven firms, six energy organizations, 
three civic associations, four civil servants, five members of parliament). I conducted all of the 
elite interviews. The array of the elites interviewed in all three studies was based on the 
positional approach in which actors representing the most salient institutions in the sector were 
discovered using an analysis of previous studies and register data. This method was 
supplemented with the reputational approach; the interviewees were also questioned about other 
influential actors in the sector (so-called snowball sampling) but the original list of elite actors 
did not change [37]. 
The fourth dataset was collected among the energy elite (i.e., decision-makers and experts in 
the field of energy policy) from August to October 2016; data was collected using structured 
online survey including two reminder rounds. This was also a survey in which the selection of 
respondents was based on a positional approach. The number of respondents was 93 out of 361 
people (25.8 %) who were sent the questionnaire. The group of respondents was large, 
comprising MPs, central government officials, decision-makers and experts functioning in the 
production of district heating, energy services, electricity trade, national, regional and local 
electricity production, electricity grids, equipment manufacturing, importation of energy 
technology, energy intensive firms, building industry, real estate management, environmental 
and other civic associations, universities, research institutes, and the mass media. The 
respondents were distributed evenly between these sectors of energy policy.  
As regards comparability of four datasets, a limitation concerns the number of elite interviews 
(24) conducted in 2008/2009. In the context of quantitative approach this number of 
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interviewees can be seen as small but within the scope of qualitative study this number is not a 
major problem. Most importantly, the group of interviewees should comprise all relevant sub-
groups of the research object [38]. The interviewed persons in our study comprised the most 
important stakeholders of energy policy as did the postal survey conducted among energy elite 
members in 2016. Moreover, the number of people belonging to the Finnish energy elite has 
traditionally been very small [39].  
In terms of timing, the elite interviews were carried out a little later than the postal survey was 
conducted among the citizenry in 2007. Nevertheless, these datasets can be roughly compared 
due to that wide-ranging effects of the international financial crisis and euro-zone crisis were 
not yet materialized in the Finnish national economy prior to the elite interviews were 
accomplished. Postal surveys among the citizenry were conducted identically in 2007 and 2016. 
Above all, the energy elite and the citizenry were asked entirely identical, structured questions 
in both periods under study. Thus, despite these limitations data-collection methods are reliable 
enough as the same procedures were applied in the same way [40]; these four datasets make it 
possible the comparison of attitudes within the elites and the citizenry as well as between them. 
In fact, the number of studies where the elites and citizenry are compared longitudinally is 
relatively limited, especially in the field of energy policy. 
 
6. Attitudes on the normative statements concerning the Finnish energy policy 
The energy elite and the citizenry were asked a structured question in 2016, as follows: “What 
is your opinion on the following statements concerning energy policy?” The response options 
were “fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “fully disagree”, and “can’t say”. 
With respect to the substance of the Finnish energy policy (Table 1), the energy elite stressed 
more the role of (global) market-based mechanisms in energy policy-making than the general 
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population; the greatest difference concerned the statements that “energy markets should be 
allowed to operate on the market terms”, and “there is sufficient competition between the 
electricity suppliers” both of which the energy elite endorsed more than the citizenry. 
Conversely, the elite emphasized less the importance of national self-sufficiency in energy 
sector and the increased public subsidies to speed up the utilization of new technology than the 
general population  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Unanimity, i.e., coherence within the energy elite and the citizenry in terms of normative 
statements can be measured using an index, as follows: (fully agree % + somewhat agree %) – 
(fully disagree %+ somewhat disagree %) /N1. The higher the index, the more unanimous was 
the elite or the citizenry. The index score for the elite was 30.0, and for the citizenry 30.3. Thus, 
the energy elite was as unanimous or coherent as the general population. Moreover, the 
attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry can be measured by the standard 
deviation with respect to the statements2. The score was 16.0. These indexes of coherence and 
standard deviation are also used in the following analyzes to compare the elites with the general 
population.  
 
7. Utilization of various energy sources for energy production in the future 
The energy elite and the citizenry were presented with a structured question: “In what direction 
should the utilization of the following energy sources be developed in Finland?”3 The question 
                                                          
1 N is the number of statements in Table 1. 
2  In Table 1 “difference” between the elite and citizenry/N. 
3 The total energy consumption by energy sources in Finland in 2015 was as follows: wood fuels 25.6% (20.5% in 
2007), oil 23.9% (24.6%), nuclear energy 18.7% (16.7%), coal 8.0% (13.0%), natural gas 6.1% (10.0%), hydro power 
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was the same in all surveys conducted in 2007 and 2016, except that in the 2016 survey “the 
future” was defined by the year 2030. Response options were “increase substantially”, “increase 
a little”, “nowadays appropriate”, “curtail a little”, “curtail substantially”, “close down totally”, 
and “can’t say” (Table 2). 
Table 2 about here 
In terms of the utilization of various energy sources, the energy elite were much more 
unanimous than the citizenry in terms of coherence index. The index scores for the elite were 
70.5 in 2007 and 62.3 in 2016, and for the citizenry 53.8 and 53.7.4 The findings indicate that 
the unanimity, or coherence, within the elite decreased, while it remained unchanged among 
the citizenry. The coherence among the elite and the citizenry was noticeably higher in terms 
of the utilization of various energy sources (Table 2) than with respect to the statements of 
energy policy (Table 1). 
The greatest differences between the elite and the citizenry in 2007 concerned the utilization of 
nuclear power, wood fuels, and biogas, all of which the elite preferred more than the general 
population. In 2016, the differences were smaller but they concerned the same energy sources 
as in 2007. The greatest disagreement between the elite and the population during the entire 
research period involved the future of nuclear power in energy production. However, dissension 
about nuclear power decreased, which can be explained by the fact that the additional 
construction of nuclear power was much debated before Parliament accepted it in 2010, while 
in 2016 it was less prominent in the mass media agenda. 
                                                          
4.6% (3.5%), net import of electricity 4.5% (3.1%), peat 4.1% (6.9%), wind power 0.6% (~0%), and other 3.8% (1.7%) 
(Statistics Finland 2007; 2016a).  
4 Unanimity within the elite and the citizenry can be measured by an index: (increase substantially % + increase a little 
%) – (curtail substantially %+ curtail a little %+close down totally)/N. 
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The attitudinal distance between the elite and the citizenry can be measured again by standard 
deviation in terms of utilization of various energy sources. Thus, the standard deviation between 
the elite and the citizenry was 15.2 in 2007 and 8.7 in 2016, respectively. This means that the 
attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased. The attitudinal 
distance between the elite and the general population was clearly lesser in 2016 in terms of the 
utilization of various energy sources than with respect to the statements many of which 
addressed the ways energy policy is directed (Table 1). This suggests that the differences 
between the energy elite and the general population may especially concern the process of 
policy-making. 
 
8. The process of energy policy-making 
The respondents were asked a structured question, as follows: “How great is the importance 
that you attach to following principles in energy policy-making?” The response options were 
“very important”, “fairly important”, “not really important”, “not important at all”, and “can’t 
say”. (Table 3). 
Table 3 about here 
In 2007, the greatest difference between the energy elite and the citizenry concerned the 
statement according to which experts should be in charge of decision making. While 91% of 
the general population perceived this statement as important, only 38% of the elite were of the 
same opinion. The other major differences concerned the principles according to which those 
politically responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decision-making (the elite 
stressed this more), and decisions should be made by consensus based on negotiations (the 
citizenry stressed this more). In 2016, the greatest difference between the elite and the general 
population dealt with the same statement as in 2007, i.e., the experts should be in charge of 
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decision-making, which the citizenry underscored more than the elite. Another major difference 
concerned the statements according to which environmental organizations should play a central 
role in decision-making (the citizenry stressed this more). 
The firms’ role in decision-making was stressed both in 2007 and 2016, slightly more by the 
elite but the difference between the elite and the citizenry was marginal. The elite accentuated 
more the role of business organizations in decision-making than the general population in 2007, 
while in 2016 there was no difference. Moreover, the elite perceived the participation of firms 
in decision-making as being slightly more important than the citizenry since 2007.  
Our finding that citizens were willing to see political power more in the hands of non-elected 
experts than businessmen was in agreement with Bengtsson and Mattila’s (2009, p. 1040) 
survey conducted among Finns in 2007 (not focused on energy policy). They found that 
approximately 30% were in favor of giving power to a more pronounced experts, while less 
than 20% wished to give more power to business leaders. These shares are lower than in our 
survey that focused on energy policy. Results from the world values survey of 1995, however, 
provided a different result, which indicated that political or economic factors might strongly 
influence the answers. Finland showed the strongest support among Western democracies for 
an extended use of expert rule in political matters. As much as 61% of the Finnish respondents 
gave a positive response to this question in 1995, compared with 33% in Norway, 34% in the 
US and 38% in Sweden 2009 [7]. 
Our datasets suggest that the citizens prioritized the involvement of the experts and 
representatives of firms more than elected officials in energy policy-making. Moreover, the 
citizenry stressed the importance of consensus and negotiations, which avoids conflicts in 
energy policy-making more than the elite. However, the elite accentuated the role of elected 
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officials in decision-making more than the general population. These findings are consistent 
with our hypothesis that the citizenry endorses stealth democracy more than the elite. 
In terms of the process of energy policy-making, the energy elite were more unanimous 
(coherent) than the citizenry; index scores for the elite were 66.4 in 2007 and 55.4 in 2016, and 
for the citizenry, they were 53.4 and 52.6, respectively. Thus, the attitudinal unanimity has 
decreased within the elite but also to a lesser extent among the citizenry from 2007 to 2016. 
The attitudinal distance between the elite and the citizenry in terms of the process can again be 
measured by the standard deviation. Because the standard deviation was 17.4 in 2007 and 10.1 
in 2016, we may conclude that the attitudinal distance between the elite and the general 
population has decreased from 2007 to 2016. As a result of that the standard deviation between 
the elite and the citizenry with respect to use of various energy sources was 15.2 in 2007 and 
8.7 in 2016 (Table 2), our hypothesis in that the attitudinal distance between the elite and the 
citizenry is lesser in relation to policy than to process was verified. However, in terms of 
statements (Table 1) the standard deviation was 16.0 in 2016, i.e., even higher than with respect 
to a process in the same year that did not support the hypothesis. 
To test our hypothesis in that the support on stealth democracy has increased among the 
citizenry but remained unchanged within the elite from 2007 to 2016, we constructed a sum 
variable from five of the statements mentioned in Table 3. The five statements all depict the 
claim of stealth democracy, as follows: “experts should be in charge of the drafting of 
decisions”, “experts should be in charge of decision-making”, “representatives of firms should 
take part in decision-making”, “business organizations should play a central role in the decision-
making”, and “decisions should be made by consensus as a result of negotiations”. The mean 
support (very or somewhat important) for the sum variable among the elite was 61.0% in 2007 
and 63.0% in 2016, while among the citizenry, it was 71.0% and 72.2%, respectively. Thus, 
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our hypothesis was not verified because the endorsement increased slightly among both the 
elite and the citizenry from 2007 to 2016. 
 
Our findings exposed a striking decreasing appreciation for democracy within the energy elite. 
In 2007, 92% of the elite agreed with the statement according to which those politically 
responsible to the constituency should be in charge of decision-making, but this number was 
no more than 68% in 2016. However, of the elite 38% in 2007 and 68% in 2016 agreed with 
the statement that experts should be in charge of decision-making. Moreover, the support for 
the idea that citizens should be able to influence decisions decreased from 76% to 61% in 2007 
and 2016, respectively. 
 
9. Effects of socio-demographic background on the support of stealth democracy 
9.1. Civic efficacy 
We have shown above that the citizens prioritized the involvement of experts and businessmen 
more than that of elected officials in energy policy-making. But how the ordinary people 
experience their own role in energy policy-making?  
To analyze the endorsement of stealth democracy among various citizens groups, we used the 
sum variable constructed in the previous chapter. The response options of “very important” or 
“somewhat important” were coded as an endorsement of stealth democracy, while the options 
of “not really important”, “not important at all”, and “can’t say” were coded as non-
endorsement of stealth democracy. 
Table 3 showed that three-fourths of people perceived their involvement as important in energy 
policy-making. However, energy issues have not played an important role in the electoral arena; 
the number of citizens who admitted that energy issues had affected their voting decision in the 
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last general election was only 25% in 2007 and 23% in 2016. The support for stealth democracy 
was higher among people whose voting decision was affected by energy issues compared with 
those whose voting decision was not affected. The dependence was statistically significant both 
in 2007 (p<.05) and 2016 (p<.001). 
In 2007, 44% of citizens agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement “I am well acquainted 
with energy issues”, while the proportion (57%) was clearly higher in 2016. The support for 
stealth democracy was higher among citizens who felt that they were knowledgeable in energy 
issues than among those who were not. The dependence was statistically significant only in 
2016 (p<.001). However, Finns’ subjective civic efficacy in the field of energy policy was low; 
only 25 % in 2007 and 24% in 2016 perceived that they can influence the Finnish energy policy 
by their own action, while 66% of the elite were of the same opinion in 2016. People who 
perceived having possibility to influence supported stealth democracy more than those who did 
not trust in their possibility to influence. However, the dependence was statistically significant 
only in 2016 (p<.001).  
In 2016, 52% of people agreed with the statement that “citizens’ opinions have not been heard 
sufficiently in energy policy decisions” (29% disagreed), while 40% of the elite agreed (57% 
disagreed). However, the Finns’ overall sense of powerlessness has decreased significantly; in 
1983-2007, the proportion of those who agreed with this statement was more than 60% (Energy 
Attitudes 2007). In 2016, support for stealth democracy was higher among people who agreed 
with the statement than among those who disagreed with it (p<.001), while among the energy 
elite members the relationship was the reverse. These findings suggest that there were 
differences with respect to endorsement of stealth democracy among people with different 
socio-economic characteristics which will be addressed next. 
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9.2. Sex and age 
Due to the fact that political consumerism, an alternative form for electoral participation, was 
found in previous studies to be connected to the citizen agency of women and the young [22], 
we expected that women support stealth democracy (which also can be seen as an alternative 
practice for controlling decision-makers through elections) more than men. Because young 
people generally voted less actively in general elections and trusted less in conventional modes 
of political participation than older people [32], we anticipated that young people will approve 
of stealth democracy more than older people.  
In contrast to our expectations, women did not support stealth democracy more than men (Table 
4). In 2007, the endorsement was the same among men and women (78%), while in 2016 it was 
slightly higher among women (80%) than men (77%). Our expectation concerning the effect of 
age was also not observed. The endorsement of stealth democracy increased linearly from the 
youngest age cohort of 18-29-year-olds to the oldest age cohort of 60-75-year-olds in 2007 and 
2016.  
Table 4 
9.3. Education and occupation 
The high levels of education and occupational position have generally been connected to active 
electoral participation [34]. Thus, we anticipated that highly educated people and individuals 
with a high occupational status would support stealth democracy less than other people because 
more well-off people have more material and knowledge-based resources at their disposal. Due 
to that the energy sector is very technical in nature, we expected that people with an engineering 
education would endorse the important role of experts representing business or public 
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administration, such as their colleagues, in energy policy-making more than people educated in 
other areas, for example, in humanities.  
Basic education partly explained the adherence to stealth democracy; the share of supporters of 
stealth democracy was lowest among people with the highest level of basic education, i.e., 
completed their matriculation examination. However, adherence to stealth democracy was not 
highest among people with lowest education (primary school) but among individuals with 
elementary school education.  
The endorsement of stealth democracy was not statistically dependent on vocational education. 
Contrary to our expectations, support was lowest among the least educated citizens, i.e., those 
who had no occupational education at all in 2007 rather than among the most highly educated 
citizens.  However, it was the second lowest among people with highest education, i.e., those 
with an academic education. In fact, the adherence to stealth democracy was highest among 
citizens with the second lowest education, i.e., vocational course. Thus, our finding differed 
from that of a Finnish survey conducted in 2007 among the general population in which the 
support on stealth democracy correlated with lower education levels [7]. 
In 2007, endorsement of stealth democracy was lowest among citizens with education in the 
natural sciences (67%), humanities and arts (65%), business (77%), and engineering (77%), and 
highest among people educated in pedagogics (89%). In 2016, the adherence to stealth 
democracy was lowest among citizens educated in social sciences (65%) and agriculture and 
forestry science (75%), and the highest among people with a business education (84%). Thus, 
the effect of the education field was not that what we expected (p>.05). 
Our expectation about a negative connection between a high occupational position and the 
support for stealth democracy was partially realized. In 2007, the support for stealth democracy 
was highest among the unemployed, pensioners and entrepreneurs, and lowest among students, 
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upper functionaries, and people with a leadership position. In 2016, the endorsement was 
highest among farmers and lower functionaries but lowest among the unemployed, students, 
upper functionaries, and people with a leadership position.  
 
9.4. Type of accommodation and political affiliation 
Individuals who own their residences have had higher likelihood of voting in general elections 
than those living in rented flats. This may partially be a result of greater stability with respect 
to residency and thus reflecting social attachment [34]. Hence, we expected that citizens living 
in rented flats endorses stealth democracy more than those who own their residence. This was 
the case in 2007 but not in 2016. In 2007, 80% of citizens who lived in rented flats endorsed 
stealth democracy, while the proportion was 78% among people who owned their residences; 
in 2016, the relationship was the reverse 77% and 79%, respectively. The dependency was not 
statistically significant (p>.05). 
The degree of attachment to the political system has varied to some extent between the voters 
of different political parties. The interest in politics, a sense of civil efficacy, and the level of 
knowledge on politics have been higher among the voters of the Conservatives and the Left 
Alliance than among the supporters of other political parties [41]. Thus, we anticipated that the 
supporters of the Conservatives and the Left Alliance would endorse stealth democracy less 
than supporters of other parties.  
However, our expectations were not realized. In 2007, stealth democracy was supported most 
by the respondents who identified themselves with the Left Alliance, the Greens, and the 
Conservatives, while the adherence to stealth democracy was lowest among citizens who did 
not want to disclose their political party identification, would not vote at all, and couldn’t say 
their party affiliations. In 2016, it was highest among supporters of the Christian Democrats 
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and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland, and lowest among those who would not vote at all  
as well as supporters of the Finns’ Party and the Greens.  
All in all, the dependence between the endorsement of stealth democracy and variables 
measuring citizens’ socio-economic background was statistically significant only in terms of 
age in 2007 and 2016, and political affiliation in 2016 (Table 4). As our expectations that were 
derived from the electoral behaviour of various citizens’ groups did not materialize, our 
hypothesis in which socio-economically underprivileged people endorse stealth democracy 
more than the privileged was not verified. 
  
10. Results  
The present study addressed whether the attitudinal distance between the Finnish energy elite 
(decision-makers and experts) and the citizenry has changed with respect to the energy policy 
between 2007 and 2016, and whether the attitudinal difference was more concerned with the 
substance of energy policy than the process of policy-making. 
With respect to use of various energy sources in energy production in the future, the attitudinal 
distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased from 2007 to 2016. The attitudinal 
distance between the elite and the general population in 2016 was clearly lesser regarding use 
of various energy sources than with respect to the statements about energy policy. Thus, in 
terms of the substance of energy policy, the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and 
the citizenry decreased from 2007 to 2016. Additionally, the attitudinal gap decreased between 
the elite and general population regarding the process. Our hypothesis in which the attitudinal 
distance between the energy elite and the citizenry is lesser in relation to substance, i.e., related 
more to policy than to process, was verified when the relationship to the policy was measured 
by the views on the utilization of various energy sources. However, with respect to policy 
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statements concerning energy policy-making, the attitudinal distance between the elite and the 
general population was even larger than for the process, which did not support the hypothesis. 
Our findings dealing with the process of energy policy-making indicated that the citizens 
prioritized participation of experts and representatives of firms more than that of elected 
officials in energy policy-making. Moreover, the citizenry stressed the importance of consensus 
and negotiations, i.e. avoiding conflicts in energy policy-making. However, the elite stressed 
the role of elected officials in decision-making more than the general population. These findings 
are consistent with our hypothesis that the citizenry endorses the stealth democracy more than 
the elite. In contrast to the hypothesis, however, the role of firms and business organization in 
decision-making was stressed slightly more by the elite, but the difference between the elite 
and general population was marginal. We also hypothesized that the support for stealth 
democracy has increased among the citizenry but remained unchangeable within the elite from 
2007 to 2016. This hypothesis was not verified; the endorsement of stealth democracy increased 
slightly among the elite and citizenry from 2007 to 2016, even more within the elite than among 
the citizenry. 
Our last hypothesis suggested that socio-economically underprivileged people endorse stealth 
democracy more than privileged people. This hypothesis was based on the findings of the 
Finnish electoral studies, which indicate that privileged citizens vote more actively in general 
elections and have higher civic efficacy than less privileged citizens. The variables under study, 
which we expected to have an effect on the endorsement of stealth democracy, were sex, age, 
education, field of education, occupational position, political party identification, and type of 
home ownership. However, our expectations were not realized, and for thus, our hypothesis 
was not verified. Citizens’ attitudes on stealth democracy, therefore, were not clearly related to 
their levels of conventional political involvement and civic efficacy.  
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Because active democratic involvement has been linked in most previous studies to citizens 
with a well-off socio-economic background, it is striking that in the case of stealth democracy 
in the field of energy policy, there was neither a positive nor negative connection. However, 
the same conclusion was made in a survey conducted among the American population in 1998; 
none of the demographic variables (sex, age, income, race, education) accounted for variations 
in support for stealth democracy. However, our findings in terms of political affiliation differed 
from the findings of previous American [6] and Finnish [39] studies that we conducted among 
the general population; in the field of Finnish energy policy conservative citizens were not more 
likely to favour stealth democracy than liberals, and by contrast, non-partisans were less 
supportive of stealth democracy than partisans.  
Our starting point was the supposition that government’s decreasing economic and political 
output since 2008 would have increased the attitudinal gap between the energy elite and the 
general population with respect to energy policy-making. Citizens’ trust in political decision-
makers is important due to the fact that important energy policy decisions are dependent on 
their political acceptability. As the attitudinal distance between the energy elite and the citizenry 
decreased both in terms of the substance and the process of energy policy from 2007 to 2016, 
the economic and political fluctuations do not seem to have affected people’s views. This is 
consistent with the finding of previous studies. Scholars have tested whether societal conditions, 
such as a booming economy, cause people to be satisfied with government. Although surges in 
support for government sometimes seem to occur during strong economic times, systematic 
analyses invariably question the role of economic conditions. Policy performance explains little 
when it comes to public trust in political institutions [42]. However, it has been observed that 
citizens’ perceptions of national economy affect more their voting decisions than changes in 
macro-economic conditions [43]. In fact, according to the Finns’ evaluations, the societal 
influence of political institutions increased in the context of a recession (in 1991-1993, 2008-
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2011) but decreased during the booming economy (in 1994-2007). However, evaluations 
regarding economic institutions such as firms showed the opposite results [30]. The attitudinal 
distance between the energy elite and the citizenry decreased in terms of the distribution of 
influence in energy policy-making [21]. 
How these findings can be assessed from the point of view of functioning of democracy. For 
this purpose we outlined a model of different types of elite structures. The elite structure can be 
described as coherent (or exclusive) when elites share similar attitudes, and there is a wide gulf 
between the attitudes of elites and the citizenry. By contrast, a fragmented elite structure is 
characterized by a wide gulf in attitudes between various elite groups, and the elites share 
similar attitudes with the general population. As regards functioning of democracy, a coherent 
elite structure is inadequate, whereas a fragmented elite structure best meets the criteria for 
classical democracy [32]. As our findings indicated that the attitudinal coherence within the 
energy elites has decreased and the attitudinal gap between the elites and the citizenry has 
reduced in terms of the substance and process of energy policy, the elite structure of the Finnish 
energy policy has moved from a coherent type to the direction of a fragment type from 2007 to 
2106. Thus, this transformation can been as positive in terms of functioning of democracy. This 
kind of elite structure provides good conditions for developing both the substance and the 
governance of energy policy. The Finnish relatively fragmented energy elite structure –together 
with citizens’ high trust in the political system, low sense of subjective civil efficacy, and 
relatively low voter turnout - may explain the fact that the Finnish Parliament could authorize 
the process for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the bedrock in 2001 and license the 
construction of two nuclear power plants in 2010, while in many countries the use of nuclear 
power has been challenged or terminated completely.  
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10. Discussion 
Our finding that education did not correlate with the endorsement of stealth democracy is 
important because a high level of knowledge can be seen as a resource that is needed in societal 
involvement. Rapeli (2010, p. 158) has observed that the level of education is not a primary 
factor in Finland, which distinguishes individuals in terms of their knowledge on politics [20]. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) have suggested that in so-called pragmatic democracies, most 
citizens have an average level of knowledge about politics, and there are few individuals who 
have little knowledge or who are very knowledgeable [44]. Rapeli’s study indicated that the 
U.S. was an example of a pragmatic democracy where citizens’ knowledge of politics was fairly 
equal, even if Finland was even more egalitarian than the U.S. In Finland, the middle stratum 
was larger, while the proportion of individuals classified as uninformed was lesser than in the 
U.S. However, in Finland, the proportion of those who are highly knowledgeable about politics 
was not larger than in the U.S. In short, the level of political knowledge among Finns was 
relatively high [18]. 
Finns’ interest in politics was relatively high; it was the eighth highest among 24 European 
countries in 2010 [19], while Hibbing and Theiss-Morse claimed that Americans’ interest was 
rather low [6]. Because the interest in politics correlates strongly with knowledge about politics 
[20] and Finns’ trust in parliament, political parties, and elected official was high (the sixth 
highest among 24 European states in 2010), we could expect that they would prioritize elected 
officials as the decision-makers for energy policy. We have shown that this was not the case. 
An explanation for this paradox can be the Finns’ low civic efficacy. The European Social 
Survey 2008 operationalized civic efficacy as a perception, according to which “politics is often 
or regularly so complicated that it is difficult to know what it is about”, and Finland was ranked 
the third lowest among 23 European states [19]. Similarly, Rapeli [20] showed that Finns’ 
knowledge base is not at such a level, which would enable well-argued and thorough discussion 
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on political issues. However, Finns’ perceptions of their own knowledge on energy issues has 
even strengthened; the proportion of citizens who felt that they are well acquainted with energy 
issues increased from 44% to 57% from 2007 to 2016. Thus far, the Finns’ fact-based 
knowledge on energy issues has not been studied, and this is an important topic for further 
research. It seems likely that Finns’ knowledge on energy issues concern more the substance 
(policy) which has been widely debated in mass media, than the process.  
Citizens’ willingness to be satisfied with experts representing business and public 
administration as opposed to elected officials – in other words, their willingness to settle for 
stealth democracy - is based on or at least encouraged by a misunderstanding of democratic 
process, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse suggest. This may also be the case in Finland with 
respect to energy policy; citizens are not well-informed about the role of elected officials and 
experts in the political decision-making process and they overemphasize the independence and 
objectivity of experts and businessmen as decision-makers. Hence, teaching people to 
appreciate the democratic process that is designated to deal with diverse interests would be an 
important step toward improving their view of government [6]. However, their key argument, 
according to which people do not want to play a more active role in democratic procedures, 
does not fit without problems to Finland. On the one hand, Finns’ weak civic efficacy in the 
field of energy policy was seen when they did not appreciate elections as an important channel 
for influencing energy policy, but, on the other hand, viewed themselves more and more 
empowered as conscious consumers through everyday consumption choices, i.e., endorsed 
political consumerism [23].  
We concluded above that the elite structure of Finnish energy policy has moved from an 
exclusive pattern to the direction of a fragmented one which can be seen as positive 
transformation in terms of functioning of democracy. However, our findings also exposed a 
decreasing appreciation for classical democracy among the energy elite. While in 2007, nine 
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out of 10 energy elite members considered that those who are politically responsible to the 
constituency should be in charge of decision-making, the proportion was no more than two-
thirds in 2016. By contrast, two-fifths in 2007 and two-thirds in 2016 agreed that experts should 
be in charge of decision-making. Moreover, support for the idea that citizens should be able to 
influence decisions decreased from three-fourths to three-fifths, respectively. This attitudinal 
change is striking because the elite members should be well-informed about the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities in a democratic policy-making because of their academic education 
and high professional status. This findings suggest that support for elitism has increased among 
the energy elite; energy policy should be decided by the experts, who have no political 
responsibility at all, rather than the political elite. This way of thinking is consistent with what 
stealth democracy suggests; people do not really want to be personally more involved in 
politics.  
However, this view can be seen as a restrictive interpretation of democracy, and it is not 
compatible with peoples’ current desires. Support for the direct democracy in the form of a 
referendum has increased worldwide, even in countries where they are unusual. Finland is one 
of these countries where three-fourths of citizens have supported the use of national 
referendums in the context of important decisions since the early 2000s (64% in 2015) [45]. 
For example, despite many requirements, a referendum on nuclear power has never been 
organized.  
The Parliament of Finland enacted the Citizens’ Initiative Act in 2012, the same year as the EU 
civic initiative came into force; if at least 50,000 citizens undersign the initiative, they can put 
forth a bill or a proposal to start drafting a law, and Parliament is obliged to place it on the 
parliamentary agenda. By February 2017, Parliament had processes 17 such initiatives out of 
more than 400 registered initiatives. One initiative has been accepted, and in three cases 
Parliament ordered the government to perform certain tasks. One of these three initiatives 
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concerned the energy certificate; Parliament ordered the government to clarify the content of 
the Energy Certificate Act. In 2015, one-third of people reported that they have signed at least 
one civic initiative, and four-fifths argued that this opportunity improves democracy. Civic 
initiatives have especially activated young people, and raised the political agenda important 
questions of values, which were previously excluded from the agenda, or divided parties 
internally. [45]. All in all, the high popularity of referendums and civic initiatives do not support 
the key claim of stealth democracy, according to which, people do not really want to be 
personally more involved in politics.  
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Table 1: The views of the energy elite and the citizenry on the statements dealing with the substance of the 
energy policy in 2016 (agree fully or somewhat %) 
Statement    Elite Citizenry Difference E-C 
Climate change is serious, but is has received far too  
little attention in our country’s political decision-making. 44 61 -17 
Finland’s dependence on the energy imports from 
Russia should be reduced.   84 79 +5 
A centralized energy system based on large-scale 
energy production units is better than the decentralized 
system based on small-scale energy production units. 36 26 +10 
The EU should direct the member states’ energy policy 
to a greater extent than they do today.  34 29 +5 
There is sufficient competition between electricity 
suppliers.    74 50 +24 
Finland should strive for the national energy 
self-sufficiency by 2030.   53 74 -21 
Public subsidies for the energy policy should be increased 
that new technology can be put into operation more 
quickly than it is today.   47 65 -18 
Energy markets should be allowed to operate on the 
market terms.    81 41 +40 
Use of petroleum and diesel as traffic fuels should be 
discontinued by 2030.   40 26 +14 
Finland should move entirely to the use of renewable 
energy sources by 2030.   36 42 -6 
 
Coherence index   30.0 30.3 
Attitudinal distance (standard deviation)    16.0 
N=    93 1349 
Table 2: The proportion of the energy elite and the citizenry who preferred to increase (substantially or 
somewhat) the use of various energy sources in the future (%) 
Energy source   2007   2016 
 Elite Citizenry Difference Elite Citizenry Difference 
   E-C   E-C 
Wind power 96 87 +9 74 77 -3 
Biogas 96 69 +26 88 74 +14 
Wood fuels 96 64 +32 77 52 +25 
Nuclear  
power 84 43 +41 43 22 +29 
Solar energy 76 91 -15 92 91 +1 
Hydroelectric 
power 66 65 +1 54 60 -6 
Peat 33 39 -6 12 22 -10 
Natural gas 25 43 -18 30 34 -4 
Coal 4 4 0 1 2 -1 
Oil 0 3 -3 1 2 -1 
 
Coherence  
index 70.5 53.8  62.3 53.7 
Attitudinal 
distance 
(standard 
deviation)   15.2   8.7 
N= 24 1180  93 1349 
 
       
        
Table 3: The proportion of the energy elite and the citizenry who perceived very or somewhat important the 
principles concerning the process of energy policy-making in 2007 and 2016 (%) 
Principle 
    2007   2016 
   Elite Citizenry Difference Elite Citizenry Difference 
Decision should be  
announced as openly as  
possible.  100 96 +4 99 95 +4 
Experts should be in charge 
of the drafting of decisions. 100 96 +4 99 94 +5 
Societal effects of decisions 
should be taken widely 
into account.  100 93 +7 100 94 +6 
Decisions should take  
account of various interest 
groups.  96 67 +29 68 69 -1 
Environmental effects of 
decisions should be taken 
widely into account. 92 95 -3 99 92 +7 
Those politically responsible 
to the constituency should  
be in charge of decision- 
making.  92 54 +38 68 56 +12 
The drafting process of 
decisions should be open. 88 90 -2 91 89 +2 
Citizens should be able to 
influence decisions. 76 75 +1 61 75 -14 
Experts should be in charge 
of decision-making. 38 91 -52 68 89 -21 
Representatives of firms 
should take part in 
decision-making. 67 62 +5 68 66 +2 
Business organizations 
should play a central role 
in decision-making. 67 41 +26 48 48 0 
Decisions should be made by 
consensus based on  
negotiations.  33 65 -32 32 64 -32 
Environmental organizations 
should play a central role in 
decision-making. 30 54 -24 28 53 -25 
Energy policy should be 
determined free of  
governmental direction 12 29 -17 21 32 -11 
 
Coherence index 66.4 53.4  55.4 52.6 
Attitudinal distance 
(standard deviation)   17.4   10.1 
N=   24 1189  93 1349 
  
    
    
Table 4: Proportion of supporters of stealth democracy among various socio-economic citizen groups in 2007 and 
2016 (%) 
 
   2007  2016 
Sex 
Men   78  77 
Women   78  80 
   p>.05  p>.05 
Age group 
18-29   72  73 
30-44   74  75 
45-59   79  76 
60-75   83  83 
   p<.05  p<.01 
Basic education 
Primary school  78  79 
Elementary school  80  80 
High school   77  78 
   p>.05  p>.05 
Vocational education 
No vocational education  74  75 
Vocational course  82  82 
Vocational school  79  78 
Polytechnic   78  81 
University   76  78 
   p>.05  p>.05 
Occupational position 
Leading position  76  76 
Upper functionary  72  72 
Lower functionary  77  85 
Blue-collar worker  76  77 
Entrepreneur   84  82 
Farmer   76  90 
Student   71  72 
Pensioner   84  81 
Homemaker   71  82 
Unemployed   89  67 
Other   81  67 
   p>.05  p>.05 
Political affiliation 
Centre Party   81  87 
Conservatives   82  84 
Social Democrats  82  83 
Left Alliance   88  83 
Swedish People’s Party  73  87 
Greens   84  74 
Christian Democrats  76  90 
Finns’ Party   74  73 
Would not vote at all  71  66 
Can’t say   72  82 
Do not want to disclose  70  75 
   p>.05  p<.05  
        
